HOW DID THE PANDEMIC SHAPE THE DYNAMICS OF TWO CIVIC COMMUNITIES?

Unraveling Complementarities and Divergences Within Spain’s Civic Culture

Ruben Diez Garcia and Ariel Sribman Mittelman

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic in Spain has taken place in a context of intense political dispute and partisan polarization, both in terms of the action of the different levels of government and the behavior of citizens (González 2017; Simón 2020, 2021). These political hostilities – which also permeate the daily, or affective, sphere – are not exclusive to the Spanish case, and are closely related to conflicts around identity that have been afflicting many democratic societies in recent decades (Fukuyama 2019). In fact, as shown by Boxell et al. (2021), affective polarization grew dramatically in the US through the period 1980–2020, and it grew less dramatically, but still consistently, during the same period in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries such as Switzerland, France, Denmark, Canada, and New Zealand.

In the case of Spain, the trend has been less consistent and presents substantial oscillations through time. Torcal and Comellas (2022, 10) show that “this phenomenon is election specific and responds to the dynamics of party competition”, identifying peaks in 1993, 2008, and 2015, and chasms in 2000–2004 and 2011. As for the current situation, however, Spain is among the countries with the greatest affective polarization, which has increased considerably in recent years and, probably, during the pandemic (Miller 2020; Torcal 2020). In this chapter, we approach the concept of civic culture and the behavior of citizens and civil society during the first phases of the pandemic. In those early phases (spring 2022), Spain was one of the countries with a more extremely restrictive lockdown, which in turn had serious social implications (Martínez-García et al. 2022). Those social implications include the polarization of beliefs based on political ideology (Bernacer et al. 2021).
In particular, we address two complementary ways of understanding this type of civic awareness in the hardest moments of confinement and the state of alarm. The central hypothesis is twofold: i) there are two dimensions to this system of values that crystallize in two ideal types of civic community, which we will call “Rousseaunian” and “Montescan”; and ii), even when dealing with communities that are often divided and polarized, they are complementary and maintain features in common – just as the citizenry revealed through action guidelines and forms of behavior that accentuated their responsibility, solidarity, and social recognition towards health personnel and public order forces.

Similarly, we suggest that some of the features or attributes that make it possible to delimit both ideal types of civic community have their roots in the evolution of networks of groups and organizations of civil society and social movements in Spain. The presence and visibility of both communities over time inform about the most relevant public consensuses and controversies in the country and are proof that, within the framework of democratic societies, the tension between social organization and change can be balanced based on the potential of a shared system of civil values and beliefs – civic culture (Díez García 2019).

Finally, we will show that the pandemic triggered two different stages in terms of civic culture. The first stage blurred the dividing lines between the “Rousseaunian” and the “Montescan” communities. However, a few weeks into the confinement established by the central government, it led to a rearticulation of preexisting positions within Spain’s polarized sociopolitical context and opened the field for those positions to manifest their differences on how to address this threat. It unleashed attributions of cross-liabilities between communities that already had different ideals and material interests before the pandemic but found reprehensible preferences in its expressions of the other communities (and their political representatives’).

Theory and (Pre-) Pandemic Politics

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the socially constructed definition of the risks we cope with (Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Dake 1992). Disregarding whether their origin is (as in this case) of a medical or biological nature, and its potential connection with environmental issues (Arias-Maldonado 2022), this chapter deals with the fact that society defines, interprets, and elaborates the medical or biological facts to face the above-mentioned risks, and different parts of each society can do so in different, even strongly opposed, ways – as happened in Spain with the COVID pandemic. Public debates around the management of the pandemic are a clear example of the collective definitions that we face in our global society around scientific (epidemiological) controversies, political and national security measures, public health strategies, or patterns of collective behavior by citizens. These collective definitions, and how we act based on them, have a direct effect on biological reality itself – in its
indissoluble interdependence with social reality; that is, on the number of infected and deceased by the outbreak.

Although there is no optimal and fully adequate theoretical perspective on risk to confront a socionatural global threat of both a premodern and a modern nature, such as this pandemic (Arias-Maldonado 2020), social risks are (following Beck (1992)) a consequence of the very process of modernization that seeks to control them. In complex societies, risks are not easily assessable or controllable through the scientific-technical logic that generate, or feeds, them in their interrelationship with the economic and political institutions of the globalized world. Political institutions are incapable of responding, with the consequent increase in distrust towards institutional (or formal) politics, and new conflicts and forms of politicization of social life emerge outside of formal politics – the subpolitical sphere. Thus, the definition of these risks and their social perception and acceptability became the subject of important public debates, scientific controversies, and conflicts, through the public policy process (Laraña 2001; Wynne 2004).

In every democratic society, other conflicts also arise that affect different and multiple spheres of social and political life. In Spain, the events that, since the Transition to democracy (1975–1978),² have given rise to the emergence of strong controversies and public debates around the event or situation that motivates them are notorious. Examples of this are the public debates and controversies around terrorism and the ways to deal with it, or the separatist process of independence in Catalonia and the pardoning of its leaders convicted of sedition; also, on issues as disparate as the relationship between men and women, gender politics, and sexual identity; education and the language to be used in certain contexts; or citizens’ relationship with the environment and living conditions. This last aspect has become especially relevant during the pandemic, given that our lifestyles directly affect the number of infections.

The existence of diverse opinions and preferences within a society, as well as the possibility of expressing them openly and having them represented in the public institutions, is usually considered a positive feature of liberal democracies (Fukuyama 2022). However, Sartori (1987) establishes a relevant difference between two forms of materialization of diversity – dissensus and conflict. The former is a positive asset in a society and constitutes the foundations of peaceful diversity; and the latter can be understood as a negative feature, that is, as “warlike behavior” (Sartori 1987, 92). In this sense, we interpret affective polarization as grounds for conflict, not as a manifestation of diversity in its positive aspect. Unlike pluralism as a “belief in the value of diversity” (Sartori 1987, 92), polarization does not lead to deliberation; it does not promote an exchange of arguments that enriches the decision-making processes and their outcomes. On the other hand, it creates divisions within the society – which, in turn, constitute a serious threat to democracy.

In moments of great uncertainty and of threat to democracy and daily life, conflict does not prevent actions of collective expression that allow numerous
and diverse individuals to identify with their political community – for example, the approval of the constitutional pact during the Transition, or the rejection of the 1981 coup d'état; the feelings of indignation and contempt towards the murders of the terrorist organization ETA in the mid-1990s and the jihadist terrorist attacks in 2004; or the corruption and collusion between politicians and plutocratic groups hatching in 2011. Episodes like these have the capacity to generate a broad consensus within civil society regarding their scope and meaning, but they regularly lead to a logic of conflict and give rise to polarization dynamics.

These forms of expression reveal the existence of circumstances that motivate a collective definition of the situation, shared by multiple actors. In these cases, citizens recognize themselves as part of the same community and subordinate their material and ideal interests in ritual forms of collective expression, which translate into mobilizations or ostensible democratic exercises of citizen participation – transversal in nature. The relevance of these events not only marks citizens biographically and generationally due to their relationship with modernization processes, but is also related to the development of a system of democratic or civic beliefs and values in Spain (Díez García and Laraña 2017).

These dynamics are promoted and disseminated by intermediate groups of civil society that act as agencies of social reflexivity by introducing public controversies and persuading citizens about a certain state of affairs. On the one hand, within the framework of this value system, changes are faced with resistance, since in such conflicts emotional aspects linked to the identities of people and their behaviors emerge. On the other hand, the situations that give rise to a widely shared definition by a plurality of actors are scarce, since particular and competing interests often emerge, manifested in the dissemination of rival discourses around the causes and the actions to be developed to face them. An analogous process seems to have taken place during the pandemic.

Although we do not have data to confirm the level of irradiation and the intensity with which these political disputes move between the institutional and media level, on the one hand, and the level of everyday life (the subpolitical sphere) on the other, we can find in our interactions examples of the growing tension and politicization of social life to which such controversies give rise – discussions and intolerant attitudes on networks, between friends, family, and colleagues in social gatherings and instant messaging groups. During this pandemic, different actors have resorted to demagogic and binary discursive structures that are related to these dynamics, which point to an increase in polarization.3

The expression of this type of conflict around material and ideal interests is compatible with the maintenance of coexistence and democratic life, thanks to value and regulatory systems that drain the expression of such conflicts through civil channels (Alexander 2006; Díez García and Alexander 2021). Civic culture implies a form of conscience, which is manifested in the behavior of people and in their social relationships, from which citizens perceive themselves and builds their identity as such, as well as their relationships with others under principles
of responsibility, respect, tolerance, and recognition of the other – of their values, goals, projects, and life opportunities. It is a system of beliefs and values linked to the ideas of the Enlightenment and the liberal-humanist tradition that is spreading in modern societies, observable in our social relations, that crystallizes in democratic institutions and produces a social order whose main actor is the citizen as a subject of rights and duties within a political community (Díez García and Laraña 2017).

The emergence and development of civic culture is a process promoted by civil society organizations and social movements since the transition to democracy. Such a process is described by some scholars as a startling paradox between the construction of a weak civil society and a strong democracy (Encarnación 2003). That is, Franco’s regime’s prohibition of associationism would have built on a national tradition of “great weakness when it comes to organizing themselves [the Spaniards] into units or groups that will together form a stable social pattern capable of withstanding the tensions and struggles normally generated within the boundaries of any nation” (Amodia 1977, 203). These dynamics would persist at least until the end of the 20th century, with the World Values Survey presenting Spain throughout that period as “one of the least-prone nations to generate the kind of associational life attached to vibrant and robust civil societies” (Encarnación 2003, 48).

Remarkable changes in this area could begin to be perceived, however, during the 1990s. In the mid-1990s there was a widespread mobilization that breathed vitality into international solidarity movements, as well as into the affiliation and participation in NGOs (Díez García and Laraña 2017). In that decade the victims’ organizations played a decisive role in the development of a civic culture, since citizens overcame their fear of the organized violence of the nationalist terrorism of ETA.4 In the next two decades, in the 21st century, these changes were linked to the emergence of crises, and therefore they were temporary. The first occurred in 2008, with the economic crisis; the second, in 2020, with the pandemic: “Spanish civil society has gained impetus with shocks like the 2008 economic crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, but it still lacks the capacity to sustain this momentum and achieve transformation in the long term” (Rey-García and Royo 2022, 6).

An Ad Hoc Methodology for the Pandemic

Regardless, what is relevant for this study is that the coronavirus pandemic did trigger a reaction by Spanish civil society. So what was that reaction? In other words, how did the two phenomena that emerged as reactions of the civil society to the pandemic crisis – the impetus towards solidarity and unity, versus the tendency towards polarization – act and interact?

We argue that the former is currently compromised by dynamics that promote discourses and actions that favor polarization and identity conflict. Such dynamics are related to at least two phenomena that have intensified in recent
decades. One is the colonization of civil society actors by political parties and related media groups, and the resulting loss of autonomy (these media groups act as sounding boards of discursive positions around highly controversial issues). The other phenomenon is the display of world-views that revolve around hermetic and segmented collective identities, which makes it difficult to recognize other civic groups as part of the political community.

To address our hypothesis, we conducted the CiudCovid2020 pilot survey and carried out ten qualitative interviews. This pilot survey presents particularities that make the sample of 793 people between 18 and 85 years old (43.4 percent men, 56.6 percent women) a case study, given the sampling strategy and the exceptional nature of the confinement. It is not, therefore, a representative sample, although the margins of error on which it works are assimilable to some common panel studies among social and market research institutes that handle samples of a comparable size. Likewise, no stratification or weighting criteria were established, with the aim of making the sample resemble the population with respect to certain parameters.

The aim, instead, was to create a sample with a substantial representation of citizens linked to political and union organizations, networks, initiatives, and associations of civil society. If we refer to some survey series from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, the frequency with which Spanish citizens are linked to this type of organization and civil society networks is considerably lower than that found in this pilot study. In the sample, which takes the 2010s as a reference, nearly two out of ten people have been, or continue to be, affiliated with a union or party, or have been, or are, registered party supporters. In addition, half of the respondents, 49.7 percent, affirm that over the last ten years they have been affiliated with, participated in, collaborated with, or supported an association, group, or citizen movement of civil society.

The questionnaire was spread across three (“ideal types”) nodes, each of them representative of citizen networks, associations, and social movements that have functioned as agencies of social reflexivity, promoting civic culture (Diez García and Laraña 2017).

The first node is represented by associations oriented to the defense of interests and specific groups, social intervention and inclusion, entrepreneurship or social economics – that is, broadly speaking, NGOs and foundations of Spain’s Third Sector. Considering the dual nature – expressive and instrumental – of these associations, among the people linked to them we can find some who share close relationships with the second node (which we discuss next), but also with the third node, according to their interests and ways of working or the situations and public debates that are generated.

The second node is made up of organizations and networks of social movements of an alternative nature, focused on social justice, which have a long history. This ideal type is epitomized by the agenda implemented by certain activists and groups in the framework of action (initially transversal and reformist) generated by the irruption of the indignados (15M) movement in May
2011. Far from of the character originally shown by the movement, that agenda displaced and excluded the key elements displayed during its birth – dialogue, inclusivity, respect, and tolerance. These dynamics can be explained by the co-optation and institutionalization of the afore-mentioned agenda at the level of formal (institutional) politics and the classic dispute within the political order by new parties such as Podemos.

At the institutional level, such parties embody – inspired by Latin American populism – confrontation with the principles of liberal democracy in favor of an agonistic model (Mouffe 2000) that “bulldozes” it by building a new hegemony. The connection between those parties – and their leaders – with Latin American populism is threefold: many such leaders built their careers on studying the Pink Tide, populist governments, leaders, and political projects; they based their political theory on philosophers such as Ernesto Laclau, who wrote positively about populism; and they wrote positively about populism themselves (Seguín 2017, 290–291).

The third node is represented by the associations that for decades have been defending the civil rights of numerous citizens in the Basque Country and Catalonia. This node has its origins in the fight against terrorism in the Basque Country at the end of the 20th century, and promoted demonstrations against the negotiation between the Socialist government and ETA between 2004 and 2007 (Argomaniz 2019). After a long period of latency, it gained visibility and power of persuasion through two large mobilizations – one held in Barcelona in October 2017 against the independence process in Catalonia; the other, in June 2021, in Madrid, against pardoning Catalan pro-independence leaders sentenced to prison by Spain’s Supreme Court in October 2019.

Submerged networks of academics, intellectuals, and associations with a plurality of material and ideal interests have played (indeed, still play) a prominent role in this node. In recent years, associations from this node have been acting in defense of the common language, Spanish, in regions with co-official languages. The origin of new parties in public life since the 2000s is located in Unión, Progreso y Democracia (2007), Ciudadanos, and VOX (2013), the last of which gave birth to a nativist populism (Turnbull-Dugarte et al. 2020) whose agenda confronts the principles and values of political liberalism. Such principles and values are essential to define a concept for many years present in the core of this node – “civic constitutionalism”.

**The Civic-Normative and Civic-Communitarian Dimensions**

The criteria for the design and selection of the variables to operationalize the dimensions of civic culture that appears in Table 13.1 and Figure 13.1 is based on previous works on its emergence and development in Spain (Díez García y Laraña 2017). In particular, we considered the importance citizenship attaches to six civic attitudes. The difficulty of operationalizing this concept does not preclude us from highlighting some central features in this type of value system
that allows an approach via aggregate data. Some of these traits can be operationalized through the importance that people give to these civic attitudes and behaviors guided by that type of civic consciousness. Previous analyses of time series on these attitudes show how strong they are in Spain, with levels comparable to those of countries with a long democratic tradition (Fernández and Díez García 2018).

Applying factor analysis to these variables allows us to extract two factors that reflect the two expected underlying dimensions. A communitarian (or Rousseauian) dimension considers democracy as a principle of legitimacy and fosters the expression of citizen will, and the second node of activist networks,

TABLE 13.1 Factorial analysis results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items included in the analysis</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To obey laws and regulations</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To respect people with other opinions</td>
<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be a responsible person</td>
<td>0.654</td>
<td>0.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To vote in elections</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To help people who are worse off than yourself</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be active in social or political associations</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Explained variance by factor (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explained variance by factor (percentage)</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total explained variance (percentage)</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


collectives and organizations of the alternative movements, and for social justice, has gravitated on this dimension. The liberal dimension (of a Montescan character) refers to the rule of law in general, specifically as a guarantee of equality and liberties – that is, it represents the limits set upon public power by the law, in order to protect basic individual rights and freedoms, and it crystallizes in the networks and associations of civic constitutionalism, linked to the third node (Díez García and Laraña 2017, 430).

In other words, following Ortega y Gasset’s (1963) distinction between democracy and liberalism, the former can be understood as the question about how many hands hold the public power, regardless of the limits of that power, whereas the latter can be understood as the question about the limits of public power, regardless of how many hands hold it. In this sense, the communitarian dimension focuses on the democratic element (that is, on the materialization of the will of the majority), whereas the liberal dimension (focusing on the liberal element) prioritizes the protection of basic individual rights and liberties according to the rule of law – that is, the restraint of public power.

The first factor highlights three key features in the delimitation of a value and institutional system of civic nature – “civil”, if we follow Jeffrey Alexander (2006): (i) compliance with laws and regulations, (ii) respect for the different ideas of other people, and (iii) responsibility as a criterion or guide for citizen action (Table 13.1). These features inform a dimension that we define as “civic-normative”, which is oriented towards a form of civic consciousness centered on the individual as a subject of rights and duties; on personal autonomy and pluralism guaranteed by the existence of stable normative frameworks. Additionally, in accordance with a perspective that emphasizes the formal aspects of democracy, a fourth feature acquires presence in this dimension: the exercise of the vote.

The second factor, on the other hand, emphasizes three essential features of civic culture for the expression of civil solidarity: (i) an active citizenry that is aware of the importance of participating in intermediate groups of civil society; (ii) solidarity towards those people in a worse situation; and (iii) voting as an expression of citizen will. These features inform a dimension that we define as “civic-communitarian”, which is oriented towards a form of civic consciousness centered on participation and the civil incorporation of new groups (Alexander 2006). Consistent with this commitment of citizens in matters that concern them, a fourth feature appears in this dimension: personal responsibility for shaping one’s own life in the community.

Having identified these dimensions, we have verified the existence – or not – of their differences, based on the behavior of citizens during the weeks of strictest confinement and of state of alarm in 2020 in relation to: (i) collaboration in networks of support for people or families who have gone through a difficult economic situation or assimilable solidarity actions (54 percent); (ii) participation in the daily applause at 8.00pm in recognition of the work of healthcare professionals (76 percent); (iii) compliance with rules and instructions (time slots and type of activities allowed to be carried out, or use of a face
mask, 91 percent); and (iv) participation in caceroladas to protest against the management of the pandemic (10 percent).

The results show that, in the “civic-normative” dimension, significant statistical differences appear between those who claimed to participate in the health applause and follow the rules and instructions, and those who did not, as well as between those who participated in caceroladas and protests, compared to those who did not. No differences were observed between those who claimed to carry out solidarity actions and those who did not. This dimension reaches its highest scores among those who participated in the health applause, perceived themselves as people who followed the rules and instructions, and those who participated in the protests.

In the “civic-community” dimension, the same trend is observed for the case of the first two variables, but with an additional factor. Significant differences are also observed between the people who stated that they carried out solidarity actions and those who did not, with higher scores reached among the former. However, the trend is reversed among those who participated in caceroladas, since the scores for those who did not participate in them for this dimension turn negative.

Concluding Remarks

This pilot study suggests that during the pandemic two civic communities coexisted, which had already been playing a leading role in the development of civic culture in Spain. The application of factor analysis to the sample, prepared on the basis of this premise, shows the existence of two dimensions of this civic consciousness: one of a normative nature, oriented towards the individual and pluralism; and one of a communitarian nature, focused on participation and solidarity. These connect with two networks or nodes of civil society and social movements that have been cohabiting and involved in important conflicts since the transition to democracy. However, their foundations are complementary, and are essential in the defense and maintenance of the modern democratic order, civil incorporation, and change.

During the first weeks of confinement, citizens and civil society exhibited the complementarity and balance of both civic communities in their commitment and sense of belonging to the broader political community in the fight against the spread of the virus. They did so through a responsible attitude, in following the rules and indications of mobility and public health, the organization of networks and solidarity actions, and the massive, daily applause for the healthcare professionals that took place since 14 March 2020.

The highest scores of the civic-communitarian dimension are linked to solidary people who participated in the applause, notwithstanding the fact that these people may also present positive scores in the civic-normative dimension if we compare these scores with those who did not participate in the applause. Likewise, both dimensions present higher and equivalent scores among people
who stated that they followed the rules, compared to those who indicated that they did not, with significantly negative scores. The course of events, however, evidenced the conflict that the situation would lead to in an already polarized context. This became visible in early May 2020, when residents began to celebrate caceroladas and protests in the Madrid neighborhood of Núñez de Balboa, spreading quickly to other neighborhoods and cities. People who participated in them show very high scores in the civic-normative dimension, becoming negative in the civic-community dimension.

This gap is related to two conflicting interpretations of the origin of caceroladas. On the one hand, there is the interpretation that motivated its promoters, who attributed responsibility for the management of the pandemic and its serious consequences to the central government. They charged the government with its lack of foresight and late reaction, the strict confinement measures, and the state of alarm (which meant a de facto suppression of individual rights) and the procedure followed to legally sanction it.

On the other, there is an interpretation that described the promoters as disloyal to the government and/or individualistic and unsupportive people focused solely on their own economic and political interests, holding them responsible for a possible increase in infections. Successively, after summer 2020, groups and neighborhood associations called to protest the selective confinements and the restrictions on mobility established by the government of the Community of Madrid in the municipalities and health areas with the highest incidence. These neighborhood groups, which had described the promoters of the caceroladas in May as irresponsible and unsupportive, promoted mobilizations in September against the measures of the regional government, considering them arbitrary, discriminatory, and segregationist, since such restrictions were concentrated in “poor neighborhoods”.

This type of dynamics exemplifies how the pandemic unleashed attributions of cross-liabilities between communities with different material interests and ideals, which has continued over time, and that political parties and related media groups have been monopolizing for partisan purposes, deepening the growing infiltration of its structures in civil society and in public debates. This is a phenomenon that already existed – the “partitocracy” (González, 2017) – and both the indignados (15M) in its beginnings and various civic associations denounced it long ago (Díez García and Laraña 2017). However, it has acquired greater strength with the appearance of new political formations, the independence process in Catalonia, and the calls for mobilization of political parties whose objective is to align audiences and potential voters with their organization and interests. The most serious consequence of these dynamics of polarization is that they dilute and discredit the very principle of responsibility of rulers and citizens, and political accountability – that is, our civic culture and the civil institutions that sustain democracy, and enable us as a society to face crises of this magnitude.
Notes

1 The expression “civic community” was suggested to us by Josep Lobera.
2 There is no consensus on the starting and finishing date of the Transition. As a reference, we will consider here the period between the death of Francisco Franco in late 1975 and the passing of the democratic Constitution in late 1978.
3 The first controversy over the government’s possible lack of foresight and the potential measures to be adopted focused on the suitability (or otherwise) of supporting the 8-M feminist demonstration and the holding of public events during the first weekend of March 2020, including a VOX rally. Likewise, the exaltation or criticism of public figures with a prominent role in the management of the pandemic accounts for this type of discursive structure, inspired and disseminated by political organizations and their related groups in the media and in civil society, which invites citizens to align themselves with – and display – a certain collective identity of a binary type.
4 According to Laraña and Diez García, until 2010, the leading issue of mass mobilizations was the defense of civil rights, which motivated 70 percent of them; the majority against terrorism and the role played by political parties and government on this issue. The rest were motivated by pacifism, gay marriage, and LGBT rights, education, family, environmental protection, social (and global) justice, labor rights, and conflicts between the Autonomous Communities (the Spanish Regions) and the State.
5 The sample consisted of professionals and researchers in the fields of virology, biology, applied economics, politics, the third sector and cooperatives, nursing, business, or law – members or sympathizers, mostly, of organizations and networks of civil society, or political parties.
6 The collection of information took place between 26 May and 4 June 2020. The sampling error, for a confidence level of 95.5 percent, and under the assumption of simple random sampling, is ±3.48 percent. The sample has two important biases: a territorial bias, given that the Community of Madrid represents 58 percent of the sample and Catalonia 15 percent; as well as a predominance of people with undergraduate and graduate studies, close to 80 percent. The questionnaire was distributed through two instant messaging applications, and through Twitter, LinkedIn, and Instagram, primarily contacting people employed and/or affiliated with civil society organizations, and/or activists, and among academic and university networks, who spread it in turn in their networks and primary and secondary social groups in a snowball sampling.
7 Membership of associations (30 percent, 2019); membership of, and/or participation in, in the present or the past, a political party (8.1 percent, 2017), and in a trade union or business association (17.7 percent, 2017).
8 Among others, Cruz Roja (Spanish Red Cross), Caritas, food banks, EAPN, and refugee aid organizations, development cooperation, or support for children and sick people at a national and international level.
9 “Rule of law” has two different translations in Spanish: “Estado de Derecho” and “imperio de la ley”. Although they are closely connected, there are nuances that differentiate one from the other. In this case, the first use (rule of law in general) corresponds to “Estado de Derecho”, whereas the second (rule of law as guarantee of equality and liberties) corresponds to “imperio de la ley”.
10 The percentage of affirmative answers in the survey is shown in parentheses.
11 Protests with pots and pans.
12 To calculate these differences, we have taken the factorial scores of $\bar{x} = 0$ and $s = 1$, obtained in both dimensions, and have applied a contrast of means in them $\bar{t}$ Student’s $t$ test in the dichotomous variables that operationalize these behaviors.
Acknowledgments

This work has been supported by the Spanish State Research Agency (grant number PID2019-104078GB-I00/AEI/10.13039/501100011033).

References


